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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Appellant Kareem Millhouse appeals the decision of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his habeas petition filed pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We will affirm. 
Millhouse is an inmate currently confined at the United States Penitentiary in 
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP Lewisburg”).  While incarcerated at USP McCreary in 
Kentucky, Millhouse was charged with a Code 104 violation for possession of a weapon.  
The written charge was issued to Millhouse after a prison officer responded to an 
inmate’s medical emergency in Housing Unit 5B, cell 112.  After the afflicted inmate was 
removed from the cell, the officer conducted a cell search for any drug-related items that 
might have contributed to the medical emergency; the officer found a homemade weapon 
hidden inside a slit near the middle of the mattress facing the wall side.  The officer 
determined that the afflicted inmate did not live in that cell but that “Rodney” Millhouse, 
identified by his inmate number, was the sole occupant of cell 112. 
At a hearing before a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”), Millhouse stated that 
the weapon was not his and noted the other inmate’s presence in his cell.  He also stated 
that he had received the mattress two weeks earlier.  The DHO considered the evidence, 
including Millhouse’s statements, the incident report, the written statement by the officer 
who discovered the weapon, and a photograph of the weapon.  Millhouse had requested 
before the hearing that surveillance video be reviewed.  The DHO did not personally 
view the footage but noted another officer’s findings that the footage was inconclusive 
because it did not show the cell’s interior.  The DHO found that Millhouse had possessed 
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the weapon, constructively, in his assigned cell, explaining that Millhouse had the most 
control over his cell’s contents as the sole occupant.  Further, the DHO rejected the 
suggestion that the inmate with the medical emergency might have put the weapon there, 
finding that it did not seem reasonable that someone in that condition would have been 
able to hide the weapon where it was found.  The DHO sanctioned Millhouse with 
forfeiture of forty-one days of good conduct time, fourteen days of disciplinary 
segregation, and three months loss of commissary privilege.  Millhouse’s administrative 
appeals were unsuccessful. 
 Millhouse then filed his § 2241 habeas petition, claiming due process violations in 
his disciplinary proceedings concerning (1) the failure to provide twenty-four hours’ 
notice of the charge against him; (2) the failure to provide a copy of the incident report 
within twenty-four hours of the incident; (3) the DHO’s failure to review the camera 
surveillance footage, as requested; and (4) the DHO’s reliance on an inaccurate incident 
report, in that it misstated Millhouse’s first name as “Rodney” in the portion of the report 
describing the incident.  Millhouse also argued that the DHO’s decision was incorrect 
because Millhouse was innocent of the charge brought against him.  As relief, Millhouse 
sought restoration of his good conduct time and removal of the incident report from his 
record.  After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the District Court denied the habeas 
petition. 
 This appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).  We review the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief de 
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novo, but we review factual findings for clear error.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 
310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits.  Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1); Vega, 493 F.3d 
at 317 n.4.  Thus, a prison disciplinary hearing that may result in the loss of good conduct 
time must provide the following minimum due process safeguards, in a proceeding before 
an impartial decision-making body:  (1) at least twenty-four hours of advance written 
notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary 
evidence; (3) assistance from an inmate representative if the charge involves complex 
issues or if the prisoner is illiterate; and (4) a written decision explaining the evidence 
relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.  See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67.  
Further, the disciplinary decision must be supported by “some evidence” in the record.   
See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 
There appears to be no dispute that Millhouse received due process in accordance 
with Wolff in that he was provided with the incident report several days in advance of the 
DHO hearing, the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence, the opportunity to have 
inmate representation, and a written decision containing the reasons for the decision.  In 
support of his due process argument, Millhouse merely repeats his allegations of other 
errors, including that the Warden failed to provide a copy of the incident report within 
twenty-four hours of the February 27, 2018 incident itself.  The incident report was 
provided to Millhouse on March 1, 2018, with the notation that it had been suspended 
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pending FBI referral for possible prosecution.  Under the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 
codification of its disciplinary procedures at 28 C.F.R. § 541, et seq., an inmate 
“ordinarily” receives the incident report within twenty-four hours of when prison staff 
becomes aware of the incident.  See 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(a).  But the regulations do not 
mandate that timing, and neither does Wolff.  The DHO explained the reason for the 
delay and concluded that Millhouse’s ability to defend against the charge at the hearing, 
which was held on March 6, 2018, had not been hindered.  Millhouse does not argue that 
he was prejudiced by the delay to support a due process claim.  See Wilson v. Ashcroft, 
350 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding, in the immigration context, that “there would 
be no due process violation in the absence of prejudice”). 
Millhouse also restates his argument that he did not receive adequate advance 
notice of the charge on which the DHO found him guilty.  Specifically, he argued that he 
was charged with a Code 104 possession of a weapon violation but was found guilty of 
constructive possession, asserting that no such Code violation exists.  However, the DHO 
found him guilty of Code 104 possession of a weapon based on a theory of constructive 
possession.  That is, Millhouse was charged with and found guilty of a Code 104 
violation, and therefore, there is no defect in notice.  Cf. Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 
145-47 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding application of the constructive possession theory in 
prison disciplinary proceedings). 
To the extent that Millhouse argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the DHO’s findings without the DHO’s personal viewing of the requested camera 
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footage, the argument has no merit.  The DHO’s decision, quoted in pertinent part in the 
District Court’s memorandum, meets the due process requirement of being supported by 
“some evidence in the record” under Hill.  See District Court Mar. 26, 2019 Mem. at 10-
11.  Millhouse asserts his innocence of the charge and that Hill does not apply to him, but 
we reject this argument.  The District Court was correct to apply Hill in evaluating 
Millhouse’s due process claims concerning his prison disciplinary proceedings.  This 
standard is minimal and “does not require examination of the entire record, independent 
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.”  Id.  Rather, the 
relevant inquiry “is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the 
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”  Id. at 455-56.  The evidence here 
included a photograph of the weapon, the reporting officer’s written statement detailing 
the situation concerning the other inmate with the medical emergency, the reason for the 
random (unannounced) cell search, the manner in which the weapon had been concealed, 
a detailed description of the homemade weapon, and the circumstance of Millhouse being 
the sole occupant of the cell.  We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the DHO’s decision.  See Denny, 708 F.3d at 145 
(explaining that a reviewing court “need only find that the DHO’s decision had ‘some 
basis in fact’ in order to affirm the decision as comporting with the Due Process Clause,” 
citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 456). 
Finally, to the extent that Millhouse claims that his due process rights were 
violated because the incident report incorrectly referred to him as “Rodney” Millhouse, 
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we discern no clear error in the District Court’s finding that the reference in the report’s 
narrative description was a typographical error.  The description specified that cell 112’s 
sole occupant was Millhouse, noting his assigned inmate register number.  That register 
number matches with Millhouse’s identification, with his correct first name, noted at the 
top of the incident report.  We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that no due 
process violation arose from the first name error contained in the description of the 
incident. 
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
